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CONFRONTING A DOUBLE-EDGED 
SWORD: PROVIDING BULLIES DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS WITHOUT 
UNDERCUTTING MASSACHUSETTS’ 
EFFORTS TO COMBAT BULLYING 
Casey B. Nathan* 
Abstract: In 2012, the Massachusetts legislature enacted Chapter 71, Sec-
tion 37H3/4 of the Massachusetts General Laws, ensuring that students 
facing long-term suspensions or expulsions receive additional rights dur-
ing disciplinary hearings. The Massachusetts law entitles accused students 
to representation by counsel and allows for the cross-examination of stu-
dent witnesses. Unfortunately, awarding these additional rights under-
mines the necessary efforts taken by the state to address school bullying. 
Nevertheless, without these rights, accused bullies have little recourse to 
address unfair or inaccurate allegations at their school hearings. Ulti-
mately, this Note proposes a solution to protect victims from the trauma 
of cross-examination by the bully’s counsel without subjecting alleged bul-
lies to unfair or inaccurate disciplinary hearings. 
Introduction 
 On April 6, 2009, eleven-year-old Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover, a 
football player and Boy Scout in Springfield, Massachusetts, hung him-
self with an extension cord on the second floor of his family’s home.1 
As early as September 2008, Carl told his mother that students at the 
New Leadership Charter School were bullying him for “acting gay.”2 
Though his mother spoke to his teachers, principal, and guidance 
counselor, the bullies continued to harass Carl.3 By October, Carl started 
acting out in school.4 A month before his death, Carl told his mother 
                                                                                                                      
* Note Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2013–2014). 
1 Susan Donaldson James, When Words Can Kill: ‘That’s So Gay,’ ABC News (Apr. 14, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/story?id=7328091#.UJ7jbaWgfzI. 
2 See A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Real Story Behind Carl Walker-Hoover’s Suicide, Essence 
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.essence.com/2009/04/16/a-parents-worst-nightmare-the-real-
story/ [hereinafter Parent’s Worst Nightmare]. 
3 See id. Carl never told his teachers the names of the children who bullied him. Id. His 
mother claims Carl was too afraid to because “he didn’t want to be labeled as a snitch.” Id. 
4 See id. 
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that he was being disruptive in class because a sixth grade gang had 
threatened to kill him.5 On the day of his death, another student threat-
ened to kill Carl after Carl knocked a television stand into the student.6 
In his suicide note, Carl apologized to his family but explained he “sim-
ply couldn’t take it anymore.”7 
* * * 
 Bullying is “a persistent pattern of intimidation and harassment 
directed at a particular student in order to humiliate, frighten, or iso-
late the child.”8 Unlike when students tease or occasionally insult an-
other, the bully-victim relationship is characterized by a real or per-
ceived imbalance of power between the bully and victim that allows the 
bully to inflict a sustained, cruel, inescapable, and irresistible torment 
that can last for years.9 Studies have shown that a victim of such tor-
ment is more likely to engage in antisocial behavior, have increased 
health problems as a child, and carry “lasting emotional and psycho-
logical scars into adulthood.”10 In other words, bullying is child abuse 
by another child.11 
 Unfortunately, bullying and victimization in schools, like the vio-
lent threats against Carl Walker-Hoover, is common.12 In 2009, officials 
at twenty-three percent of public schools observed that bullying oc-
curred on a daily or weekly basis.13 Moreover, from 1992 to 2010, be-
tween one and ten children committed suicide at school each year.14 
 As a result, finding methods to protect victims from school vio-
lence and bullying has become a priority nationwide.15 Since 1999, 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and Con-
stitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 641, 645 (2004). 
9 See T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Weddle, supra note 8, at 645 (noting that victims are unable to resist because there is often 
an imbalance of power between bullies and victims, and when bullies are confronted they 
can often lie their way out of trouble). 
10 See T.K., 779 F. Supp. 2d at 304–05 (discussing numerous studies that demonstrate 
the long-term effect of bullying on victims). 
11 Weddle, supra note 8, at 645. 
12 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011 
iv–v (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/iscs11.pdf. 
13 See id. at v. That year thirty-nine percent of sixth graders reported being bullied. Id. 
14 See id. at 6. These statistics do not account for the death of students who, like Carl 
Walker-Hoover, commit suicide while at home. See id.; James, supra note 1. 
15 See, e.g., Weddle, supra note 8, at 642; Jackie Calmes, Obamas Focus on Antibullying Ef-
forts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2011, at A18 (noting that President Barack Obama opened a 
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forty-nine states have passed anti-bullying laws, including Massachu-
setts.16 Anti-bullying laws try to confront the problem of violence in 
school by requiring school districts to define an anti-bullying policy, 
with specific consequences for those students who are found to be bul-
lies.17 In an attempt to decrease the underreporting of bullying behav-
ior, anti-bullying laws typically require school employees to report and 
encourage others to report any bullying suspicions.18 
 Still, many of the early anti-bullying laws were ineffective in reduc-
ing incidents of bullying because they did not change the culture of 
schools that inconsistently enforced anti-bullying policies.19 These early 
attempts at anti-bullying laws granted schools wide discretion to im-
plement anti-bullying policies even though, as scholars have noted, 
schools are naturally incentivized not to draw attention to any bullying 
problems at their school.20 As a result, whether a school effectively en-
forced the policies prescribed in the early anti-bullying laws was largely 
based on the overall school culture, or climate, regarding bullying be-
fore the anti-bullying law was passed.21 
 Additionally, in response to the severe bullying of students like 
Carl Walker-Hoover, many schools implemented incident specific zero 
tolerance policies towards bullying instead of preventative anti-bullying 
policies.22 Zero tolerance policies follow a strict liability approach to-
                                                                                                                      
White House conference aimed to “spur antibullying efforts in schools and communities 
nationwide”). 
16 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O (2010); Bully Police USA, http://www.bully 
police.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (compiling and grading each state’s anti-bullying stat-
ute). While no federal anti-bullying law has been passed, the No Child Left Behind Act 
requires states receiving federal funding to provide students that are either victims of vio-
lent crimes or attend persistently dangerous public schools with the opportunity to attend 
safe public schools. See No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7912 (2006) 
17 See, e.g., ch. 71, § 37O(d) (“Each school district . . . shall develop, adhere to and update 
a plan to address bullying prevention and intervention in consultation with teachers, school 
staff, professional support personnel, school volunteers, administrators, community repre-
sentatives, local law enforcement agencies, students, parents and guardians.”) (emphasis 
added); Weddle, supra note 8, at 674–75. 
18 See, e.g., ch. 71, § 37O(g) (“A member of a school staff . . . shall immediately report 
any instance of bullying or retaliation the staff member has witnessed or become aware of 
to the principal or to the school official identified in the plan as responsible for receiving 
such reports or both.”); Weddle, supra note 8, at 674. 
19 See Leah M. Christensen, Sticks, Stones, and Schoolyard Bullies: Restorative Justice, Media-
tion and a New Approach to Conflict Resolution in Our Schools, 9 Nev. L.J. 545, 555–57, 562 
(2009) (discussing the general ineffectiveness of anti-bullying legislation). 
20 See id. at 557. 
21 See id.; Weddle, supra note 8, at 676. 
22 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 558–59; Melanie Riccobene Jarboe, Note, “Expelled 
to Nowhere”: School Exclusion Laws in Massachusetts, 31 B.C. Third World L.J. 343, 346–51 
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wards misbehavior; that is, administrators may enforce punishments 
without considering why the student did not follow the school rule.23 
When students are implicated in bullying behavior, these policies ne-
cessitate that the student be suspended or expelled and often require 
the schools to report the bullying to the police.24 Research has shown, 
however, that zero-tolerance policies concerning bullying are not effec-
tive because such policies focus on punishing a particular incident of 
bullying rather than addressing why the student bullied the victim or 
why the class dynamic allowed such bullying.25 
 As scholars have noted, since schools began following zero toler-
ance policies in response to general school violence suspension and 
expulsion rates have increased without improving school safety.26 Yet, 
studies have shown that a student who is removed from a school envi-
ronment because of a long-term suspension or expulsion is more likely 
to drop out of school, use drugs, and become involved with the crimi-
nal justice system.27 Consequently, instead of rehabilitating students 
who misbehave in an educational setting, zero tolerance polices give 
                                                                                                                      
(2011) (discussing the evolution of zero tolerance policies in Massachusetts); Adrian 
Walker, Vigilance to a Fault, Bos. Globe, Jan. 23, 2010, at B11 (noting the use of zero toler-
ance policies in the Worcester public school district in Massachusetts in response to school 
violence). 
23 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 679–80. 
24 See id.; Greg Toppo, Bullies as Criminals?, USA Today, June 13, 2012, 1A (“Nine states 
require administrators to report bullying to the police.”). In Massachusetts, principals are 
encouraged to report bullying to the police if they think criminal charges can be pursued 
against the bully. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O(g)(i) (2010). 
25 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 558–59; Scott R. Simpson, Comment, Report Card: 
Grading the Country’s Response to Columbine, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 415, 442 (2005) (noting the 
failure of zero tolerance policies to work in general). 
26 See Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)tolerance Policies? Weaponless School Violence, Due 
Process, and the Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An Examination of Fuller v. Decatur 
Public School Board of Education School District, 2002 BYU Educ. & L.J. 159, 165 (noting 
that schools that utilize zero tolerance policies are less safe than schools without those 
policies); India Geronimo, Systemic Failure: The School-to-Prison Pipeline and Discrimination 
Against Poor Minority Students, 13 J.L. Soc’y 281, 284–85 (2011) (noting the rapid increase 
of school suspensions and expulsions once zero tolerance policies are adopted). Zero tol-
erance policies have likely increased suspension rates because they do not consider the 
student’s reason for violating the policy. See Christensen, supra note 19, at 559; Geronimo, 
supra, at 284–85. 
27 See Deborah N. Archer, Introduction: Challenging the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 54 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 867, 868 (2009–2010); Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline 
Policies Turned Into a Nightmare? The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity 
Grounded in Brown v. Board of Education, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 289, 316, 331 
(2005) (reasoning that students who are suspended or expelled are more likely to drop 
out of school because they struggle, fall behind when they are away from school, and 
struggle to ever get back on track). 
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students less access to educational opportunities, steering those stu-
dents towards a life of crime.28 As a result, zero tolerance policies have 
been largely unsuccessful and have contributed to the creation of the 
“school-to-prison pipeline.”29 
 In an effort to limit the effects of the “school-to-prison pipeline”, 
on August 6, 2012, Massachusetts passed Chapter 71, Section 37H3/4 
of the Massachusetts General Laws.30 Section 37H3/4 limits the length 
of any suspension or expulsion of a student to ninety days unless the 
student (1) is found on the school premises in possession of a “danger-
ous weapon” or “controlled substance;” (2) assaults a member of the 
educational staff on school premises; or (3) is charged and convicted of 
a felony.31 In addition, section 37H3/4 grants specific due process 
rights to students who are suspended for more than ten days for either 
a singular infraction or the accumulation of multiple infractions.32 The 
specifically afforded due process rights include the right to: (1) a hear-
ing; (2) present oral and written testimony; (3) have counsel at the 
hearing; and (4) cross-examine witness.33 
 This increase in due process rights by permitting accused students 
access to counsel and the ability cross-examine witnesses has created a 
double-edged sword.34 Under Section 37H3/4, bullies who face long-
                                                                                                                      
28 See Archer, supra note 27, at 868–69; Hanson, supra note 27, at 316, 331 (noting that 
zero tolerance criminalizes behavior by punishing students with a life of inadequate educa-
tion). 
29 See Archer, supra note 27, at 868–69; Geronimo, supra note 26, at 284. The phe-
nomenon of the school-to-prison pipeline has been described as “the collection of educa-
tion and public safety policies and practices that push our nation’s schoolchildren out of 
the classroom and into the streets, the juvenile justice system, or the criminal justice sys-
tem.” Archer, supra note 27, at 868. 
30 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H3/4 (2012); Shannon Young, New Mass. Law Gives 
Expelled Students More Options, Associated Press (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.boston.com/ 
news/local/massachusetts/articles/2012/08/10/new_mass_law_gives_expelled_students_
more_options/?s_campaign=8315 (quoting Mitchell Chester, the Massachusetts Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education commissioner, when he said, “[w]e shouldn’t be washing 
our hands of school aged-youth by expelling them”). Section 37H3/4 will go into effect on 
July 1, 2014. Ch. 71, § 37H3/4. 
31 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H(a)–(b) (2010) (subjecting students to expulsion 
for possessing weapons or narcotics, or assaulting school staff); id. § 37H1/2(2) (permit-
ting principals to expel students who are convicted of a felony or who admitted in court 
that they were guilty of committing a felony); id. § 37H3/4(a) (“This section shall govern 
the suspension and expulsion of students enrolled in a public school in the common-
wealth who are not charged with a violation of subsections (a) or (b) of section 37H or 
with a felony under section 37H1/2.”). 
32 See id. § 37H3/4(d)–(e). 
33 See id. 
34 See Hanson, supra note 27, at 331 (noting that the use of zero tolerance policies may 
cause many children to turn towards a life of crime); Weddle, supra note 8, at 645; see also 
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term suspensions—like all students facing such punishment—are enti-
tled to cross-examine student witnesses, including their victims.35 Such 
cross-examination forces children like Carl Walker-Hoover to relive the 
bullying, thereby subjecting them to further unnecessary trauma.36 Fur-
thermore, because some children are highly suggestible when under 
cross-examination, adept attorneys may be able to distort the truth and 
undermine the victimized child’s credibility and incentive to speak out 
about the bullying incident.37 Consequently, discrediting the victim will 
enable bullies to justify their actions, thereby reinforcing bullying be-
havior and undermining the efforts that have been made to prohibit 
and prevent bullying in schools.38 
 This Note examines the conflict between Massachusetts’s effort to 
protect bullying victims and its need to ensure alleged bullies are not 
unfairly deprived of educational opportunities. Part I of this Note pre-
sents the history of limited procedural due process protections af-
forded to students through the due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts 
State Constitution. Part II discusses a student’s constitutional right to 
education in Massachusetts and analyzes the state court decisions that 
determined the level of substantive due process afforded to both bullies 
and victims. 
 Part III of this Note discusses the natural difficulties of implement-
ing successful anti-bullying policies and examines the recent effort by 
the Massachusetts legislature to force schools to follow anti-bullying 
                                                                                                                      
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding it is “criti-
cally important” to protect the anonymity of students who report serious school offenses); 
cf. Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ 
Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y 
& L. 465, 475 (2002–2003) (noting symptoms of trauma are exacerbated in domestic vio-
lence victims when they are forced to repeatedly discuss the abuse). 
35 See ch. 71, § 37H3/4. 
36 See T.K., 779 F. Supp. 2d at 304–05 (discussing the long-term and traumatic effects of 
bullying); Weddle, supra note 8, at 645 (noting that bullying is a form of child abuse); cf. 
George K. Goodhue, Comment, Maryland v. Craig: Balancing Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Rights with the Rights of Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Trials, 26 New Eng. L. Rev 497, 497–
98 (1991–1992) (noting that an extensive body of professional research indicates that 
children of sexual abuse forced to testify in court with the accused present suffer a second 
victimization and traumatization). 
37 See Tom Lininger, Kids Say the Darndest Things: The Prosecutorial Use of Hearsay State-
ments by Children, 82 Ind. L.J. 999, 1002–03 (2007) (examining the effects of cross-
examination of children in child abuse cases). 
38 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 548–49 (suggesting that bullies feel victimized 
when reprimanded by the school, and justify their actions as a means of defending them-
selves); Lininger, supra note 37, at 1002–03; Weddle, supra note 8, at 642. 
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measures designed to change current school bullying cultures. Finally, 
Part IV critiques the effect of entitling bullies to additional due process 
rights and proposes an approach for schools to guarantee the rights of 
bullies without subjecting victims to unnecessary scrutiny under cross-
examination. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the law should be 
amended so that victims will only be questioned by a neutral third party 
adult outside of the presence of the bully. Such a measure would protect 
victims while continuing to ensure alleged bullies are given a fair oppor-
tunity to defend against the victim’s allegations at a disciplinary hearing. 
I. Judicially Imposed Procedural Due Process Requirements  
for School Discipline 
 Unless regulated by state legislatures, students are not typically 
granted the right to counsel and cross-examination in disciplinary pro-
ceedings.39 Students seeking these protections have two major avenues 
of recourse.40 Students may either make a claim in federal court that 
the school’s disciplinary procedures infringe upon the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or they may claim in state court 
that the school’s procedures violate the respective state constitution’s 
due process clause.41 Nevertheless, federal and Massachusetts state 
courts have seldom afforded Massachusetts students the right to coun-
sel or cross-examination.42 
A. Federal Constitutional Protection 
 Federal courts have generally allowed educational officials and 
state legislatures to determine the procedural disciplinary rules appli-
                                                                                                                      
39 See B.S. ex rel. Schneider v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2003) 
(“[T]he clear weight of authority holds that a student facing an expulsion hearing does 
not have the right to cross-examine witnesses or even learn their identities.”); Ellen L. 
Mossman, Comment, Navigating a Legal Dilemma: A Student’s Right to Legal Counsel in Disci-
plinary Hearings for Criminal Misbehavior, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585, 600 (2012) (noting most 
courts have avoided requiring counsel in student disciplinary hearings). 
40 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975) (considering whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords students procedural due process rights be-
fore a suspension); Parkins v. Boule, No. 94-000987, 331, 338–39,(Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 
1994), available at 1994 WL 879558 (alleging school suspension violated state procedural 
due process protections). 
41 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572; Parkins, No. 94-000987, at 338–39. 
42 See B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 899; 38 Mass. Practice Administrative Law and Practice 
§ 226 (2012) (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) does not gen-
erally grant greater procedural due process protections than the federal Constitution re-
quires); Mossman, supra note 39, at 600. 
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cable to children in public schools.43 In the earliest era of school disci-
pline, schools acted as in loco parentis to students.44 Since schools essen-
tially stood in for parents while their child was at school, students were 
not entitled to any procedural due process protections under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in school disci-
plinary proceedings.45 
 The in loco parentis doctrine pertaining to school discipline was 
abandoned by the Supreme Court in the seminal 1975 decision, Goss v. 
Lopez.46 In Goss, the Court held that, pursuant to the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, public school students sus-
pended for ten days or less without an informal hearing were unconsti-
tutionally denied their property right to education.47 The Court, how-
ever, refrained from requiring schools to implement trial type discipli-
nary hearings where students may have counsel and cross-examine 
witnesses.48 Instead, the Court held that when a public school disci-
plines students with a suspension for ten days or less—a short-term sus-
pension—the school is only constitutionally required to provide stu-
dents with (1) notice of the suspension and (2) an informal hearing 
where accused students have an opportunity to present their side of the 
story.49 The Court reasoned that, at least for short-term suspensions, 
these rudimentary protections are sufficient to prevent schools from 
arbitrarily or erroneously excluding students without overwhelming 
school resources.50 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Julie Underwood, The 30th Anniversary of Goss v. Lopez, 198 Educ. L. Rep. 795, 
795–97 (2005) (tracing the history of federal procedural due process rights granted in the 
school setting). 
44 Underwood, supra note 43, at 795; see also Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 
686 (6th Cir. 1947) (“The term ‘in loco parentis,’ according to its generally accepted com-
mon law meaning, refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent 
by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the for-
malities necessary to legal adoption.”). 
45 Underwood, supra note 43, at 795. 
46 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 580–81; Perry A. Zirkel & Mark N. Covelle, State Laws for Student 
Suspension Procedures: The Other Progeny of Goss v. Lopez, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 343, 343–44 
(2009); see also Underwood, supra note 43, at 795. 
47 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 568–69, 574. Still, the court held that the students’ “legitimate 
entitlement to a public education” was not derived from the Constitution. See id. at 573–74. 
Rather, this property right was derived from an Ohio statute, which required local com-
munities to provide education to all residents between five and twenty one years old. See id. 
48 See id. at 583. 
49 Id. at 581. Additionally, while the Court cautioned that generally an informal hear-
ing should take place before the suspension, the Court held that in situations where the 
student poses a continuing danger to the academic process, the notice and informal hear-
ing need only take place “as soon as practicable.” See id. at 582–83. 
50 See id. at 581, 583–84. 
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 For long-term suspensions or expulsions, however, the Court sug-
gested that students may be entitled to more formal disciplinary proce-
dures.51 Some subsequent lower court decisions have interpreted this 
suggestion to mean that, at least when the penalty is as severe as expul-
sion, the hearing officer must permit students to be assisted by an at-
torney and cross-examine witnesses.52 Nevertheless, most subsequent 
court decisions have not interpreted Goss so rigidly.53 
 Instead, most courts have assessed whether additional procedures 
are necessary by following the flexible, policy-oriented analysis of pro-
cedural due process provided by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. El-
dridge.54 Under Mathews, the touchstone of a court’s analysis is whether 
the procedure was fair.55 Courts, therefore, do not determine whether 
                                                                                                                      
51 See id. at 584. Still, the Court made clear that it was not addressing the necessary due 
process protections for longer suspensions, which may be considered a greater deprivation 
of a student’s property right to education. See id. at 576, 584. 
52 See Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (D.N.H. 2002) (citing Carey ex rel. 
Carey v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 919 (D. Me. 1990)) (enumerating 
seven minimum requirements that must be observed in long-term student disciplinary 
hearings, including that the hearing officer must permit the student to have counsel and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 
1977) (“Goss clearly anticipates that where the student is faced with the severe penalty of 
expulsion he shall have the right to be represented by and through counsel, to present 
evidence on his own behalf, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”). 
53 See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14–15 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that requiring 
additional procedures, outside of the right to notice and a hearing, must be determined by 
carefully balancing the interests of the student and school); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 
655, 660 (11th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that, in expulsion proceedings for university students, 
“[w]hat process is due is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical re-
quirements of the circumstances”) (emphasis added); see also Donald H. Stone & Linda S. 
Stone, Dangerous & Disruptive or Simply Cutting Class; When Should Schools Kick Kids to the 
Curb?: An Empirical Study of School Suspension and Due Process Rights, 13 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1, 
3–6 (2011) (noting the varying results by subsequent courts when addressing a student’s 
right to cross-examination and counsel). 
54 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“‘[D]ue process is flexible and 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’”) (quoting Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (emphasis added); Newsome v. Batavia Local 
Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 1988); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13–14; Nash, 812 F.2d at 
660. The Court in Mathews addressed the procedures necessary under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to terminate Social Security disability benefit payments. 
424 U.S. at 323. 
55 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12. Under Mathews, to determine whether a procedure is fair 
a court must weigh three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail. 
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the disciplinary process was totally accurate or properly imposed.56 
Rather, following Mathews and Goss, most courts inquire on a case-by-
case basis whether the value the student gains from additional proce-
dural safeguards outweighs the burden those safeguards place upon 
the school.57 
 With school violence having increased since the Court’s 1975 deci-
sion in Goss, however, courts have struggled to find a balance between 
overly burdening school officials with intensive, formal adversarial 
hearings and ensuring that students are given a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard.58 Accordingly, several courts have addressed whether 
students have a right to counsel and cross-examination in a long-term 
disciplinary proceeding with mixed results.59 
1. Right to Counsel 
 Following Goss, courts have rarely found that due process includes 
the right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings.60 Moreover, courts ap-
plying Mathews have reasoned that disciplinary hearings without coun-
sel are fundamentally fair unless the proceedings are overly complex, 
the student is also implicated in criminal charges, or the school itself 
has legal representation at the hearing.61 Courts have also recognized 
that entitling students to an attorney may force disciplinary proceed-
ings to become overly adversarial, thereby imposing unnecessary ad-
ministrative costs on the school.62 Courts are therefore reluctant to rec-
                                                                                                                      
424 U.S. at 335. 
56 See Nash, 812 F.2d at 660–61. 
57 See Newsome, 842 F.2d at 924; Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14–15; Nash, 812 F.2d at 660. 
58 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583–84 (warning against overly formalizing suspension procedures 
because it may make it too costly or destroy the suspension’s effectiveness as a part of the 
teaching process); Newsome, 842 F.2d at 924–25 (holding that balancing the value of cross-
examining student witnesses against the burden of allowing cross-examination must take into 
account the “severe challenges” that schools face in maintaining order and discipline). 
59 See Stone & Stone, supra note 53, at 4, 6–7. 
60 See Mossman, supra note 39, at 600. 
61 See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
the school hearing was not complex enough to require a school to allow the student to 
have an attorney present); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16 (“[T]he weight of authority is against 
representation by counsel at disciplinary hearings, unless the student is also facing crimi-
nal charges stemming from the incident in question.”); Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 
597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (“Had an attorney presented the University’s 
case, or had the hearing been subject to complex rules of evidence or procedure, plaintiff 
may have had a constitutional right to representation.”). 
62 See, e.g., Flaim, 418 F.3d at 640–41 (finding administrative cost of allowing counsel 
outweighed the value of improving the quality of a student’s defense of expulsion); Osteen 
v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225–26 (7th Cir. 1993) (implying that while a student may have a 
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ognize a student’s right to counsel unless the consequences in a par-
ticular disciplinary hearing, such as a risk of error, substantially out-
weigh the administrative costs to the school.63 
2. Right to Cross-Examine Student Witnesses 
 As a general rule, the Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle 
students to confront and cross-examine other students at long-term 
disciplinary hearings.64 In Newsome v. Batavia Local School District, the 
plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old high school student, was expelled solely 
based on the statements of two accusing students.65 Although he was 
permitted to have counsel at his disciplinary hearing, the school board 
denied the plaintiff’s request to learn the identity of the accusing stu-
dents or cross-examine the school official who took the accusing stu-
dents’ statements.66 
 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that schools can 
deny expelled students the right to cross-examine or know the names 
of the student accusers.67 The court reasoned that school administra-
tors, who generally know the accusing student firsthand, can properly 
gauge the believability of the student’s accusation.68 Accordingly, the 
court reasoned that while the value of cross-examination to discover the 
truth “cannot be overemphasized,” that value is mitigated by the 
                                                                                                                      
right to consult counsel, the counsel does not need to be allowed to participate in the 
hearing). As noted by the court in Osteen v. Henley, entitling students to counsel at a disci-
plinary proceeding may require the school to hire a lawyer to prosecute the case and to 
hire outside lawyers to serve as judges. See 13 F.3d at 225. 
63 See Osteen, 13 F.3d at 226 (“The cost of judicializing disciplinary proceedings by rec-
ognizing a right to counsel is nontrivial, while the risk of error—specifically the risk that [the 
student] was unjustly ‘sentenced’ —is rather trivial.”) (emphasis added); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 
16 (noting the weight of authority is against representation of counsel). 
64 See, e.g., B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 897, 899 (“[T]he clear weight of authority holds that 
a student facing an expulsion hearing does not have the right to cross-examine witnesses 
or even learn their identities.”); Newsome, 842 F.2d at 923–25 (finding high school student 
had no due process right to learn identity of or cross-examine accusing students in an 
expulsion proceeding); E.K. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 557 F. Supp. 2d 272, 276–78 (D. 
Conn. 2008) (finding student accused of making threatening comments to another stu-
dent has no due process right to confront the student in an expulsion proceeding); Brown 
v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. Dist. 202, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070–71, 1075–76 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (finding school did not violate student’s due process rights when refusing to allow 
him to cross-examine adverse student witnesses). 
65 842 F.2d at 921–22. The plaintiff was accused of possessing and attempting to sell a 
marijuana cigarette on school property. Id. at 921. 
66 Id. The principal took the initial statements of the two accusing students. Id. 
67 See id. at 924–25. 
68 See id. at 924. 
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strength of a school administrator’s judgment.69 In addition, the court 
found it “critically important” to protect the anonymity of student wit-
nesses who are willing to notify school authorities of serious offenses by 
other students.70 Thus, the court held that a school’s obligation to pro-
tect student witnesses outweighed the value of allowing accused stu-
dents to cross-examine their accusers.71 
 Nevertheless, while many courts have adhered to or extended the 
rationale in Newsome, at least one court has held that due process is vio-
lated if the student is given no meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
validity of another student’s allegations.72 In Johnson v. Collins, the stu-
dent was accused of writing a bomb threat on a classroom chalkboard.73 
Though he was acquitted in juvenile court, the student was expelled 
after the school board heard testimony from the captain of the local 
police department and the principal of the school.74 
 The Johnson court held that the student was denied due process in 
his expulsion proceeding because the school board had no opportunity 
to consider the credibility of the two accusing students.75 The court rea-
soned that the school board could not rely on the police captain’s testi-
mony because the captain had not interviewed the two accusing stu-
dents himself.76 Instead, the captain had merely relied upon what he 
learned from the other interviewing officers.77 Additionally, the court 
reasoned that the accusing students’ allegations were unreliable because 
they had been implicated in the bomb threat and were given immunity 
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 925. 
71 See id. 
72 See B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 898, 900 (noting that the rationale of Newsome has been 
extended to multiple courts for documents that might be used in cross-examination); John-
son, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 249–50 (finding school’s refusal to permit student to cross-examine 
witnesses deprived the student of “any meaningful opportunity to defend against the [ex-
pulsion] charges”); see also Brown, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (applying Newsome); Wagner v. 
Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926–27 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (noting the “moun-
tain of case law” derived from “Newsome and its progeny” that holds students do not have 
the right to cross-examine witnesses at school hearings). 
73 Johnson, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
74 See id. at 245, 250. The student was criminally charged by the police on two counts: 
(1) filing a false report of an explosive device, and (2) criminal mischief. Id. at 245. He was 
subsequently granted a directed verdict on the first count, but convicted on the second 
count. Id. As the court noted, though, the basis of the student’s expulsion was not related 
to the criminal mischief conviction. Id. 
75 See id. at 249–50. 
76 Id. at 250. 
77 See id. 
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in exchange for their statements to the police.78 Thus, the court held 
that the school board did not provide a fair hearing because without an 
opportunity to hear the cross-examination of the accusing students, the 
board would be unable to gauge the believability of the accusations.79 
B. Procedural Due Process Protections Under the Massachusetts Constitution 
 Massachusetts courts have never addressed whether a student in 
elementary or secondary school is entitled to counsel or cross-
examination in school disciplinary hearings under the due process pro-
tections of the Massachusetts Constitution.80 Certainly, Massachusetts 
students have alleged in both federal and state court that they were de-
prived of their Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel and cross-
examination in disciplinary proceedings.81 Still, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court (SJC) has generally held that the procedural due 
process protections derived from the Massachusetts Constitution are 
subject to the same analysis as, and provide no greater rights than, the 
Fourteenth Amendment.82 Moreover, as scholars have noted, “even 
where a state procedural due process claim has been raised, the [SJC] 
has almost universally declined to rest its decision on state due process 
grounds or even to acknowledge any possible merit in the state due 
process claim.”83 
 In addition, the Massachusetts legislature has provided students 
with greater procedural protections than Goss requires.84 Since the early 
                                                                                                                      
78 Id. 
79 See id. 
80 But see Coveney v. President of Coll. of the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Mass. 
1983) (finding private university student did not have right to counsel in expulsion pro-
ceeding); Protonotarios v. Duggan, No. CA99053L2, 389, 390 (Mass. Super. Nov. 10, 2000), 
available at 2000 WL 1716255 (finding public university student had no constitutional right 
to counsel or cross-examination in a student disciplinary proceeding for a six-month sus-
pension unless the student is also facing criminal charges). 
81 See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Ashburnham Westminster Reg’l Sch. Dist., 410 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 
(D. Mass. 2006) (alleging in federal court that public high school student was not permit-
ted to have counsel at an expulsion hearing); Whitney v. Ashburnham-Westminster Reg’l 
Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 1185116, at *2 (Mass. Super. Feb. 22, 1996) (alleging in state court 
that the school had deprived the student of federal due process protections). 
82 See Sch. Comm. of Hatfield v. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.E.2d 237, 238 n.2 (Mass. 1977) 
(“The protection afforded property interests by both [federal and state due process] provi-
sions is subject to the same analysis.”); Cella et al., supra note 42, at 495; see also Mass. 
Const. pt. I, art. 10 (“Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the 
enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws.”). 
83 38 Mass. Practice, supra note 42, § 226. 
84 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H (Supp. 1987) (requiring school committees to 
establish written procedures for disciplinary proceedings); Carr v. Inhabitants of Dighton, 
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1900s, school committees in Massachusetts have been statutorily re-
quired to provide a student with an opportunity to be heard prior to a 
student’s expulsion.85 By 1987, every school district was required to es-
tablish written procedures assuring due process in disciplinary proceed-
ings.86 
 Furthermore, in 1994 the Commissioner of the Massachusetts De-
partment of Education encouraged districts to entitle students facing 
long-term suspensions or expulsions to legal representation at discipli-
nary hearings.87 The Commissioner also suggested that students be enti-
tled to cross-examine witnesses at the disciplinary hearing, but stopped 
short of encouraging districts from adopting an unrestricted policy.88 
Instead, he encouraged schools to prevent the cross-examination of stu-
dent witnesses who would be subject to retaliation at school for appear-
ing as witnesses.89 
 Finally, students who are unlawfully excluded from public school 
have historically been allowed to bring an action against the school dis-
trict and town for monetary damages.90 Thus, the school districts have 
had a pecuniary interest in assuring that long-term suspensions or ex-
pulsions comply with procedural due process.91 Accordingly, prior to the 
passage of Chapter 71, Section 37H3/4 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws Massachusetts schools were encouraged, but not required by either 
                                                                                                                      
118 N.E. 525, 526 (Mass. 1918) (analyzing procedural statutory rights entitled to a student 
before an expulsion). 
85 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, § 17 (2010) (“A school committee shall not perma-
nently exclude a pupil from the public schools for alleged misconduct without first giving 
him and his parent or guardian an opportunity to be heard.”); Carr, 118 N.E. at 526 (ac-
knowledging the statutory language providing students with a right to be heard prior to 
exclusion from school). 
86 See ch. 71, § 37H. 
87 Advisory Opinion on Student Discipline, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Sec-
ondary Education, § 10 (1994), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/advisory/ 
discipline/AOSD1.html [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]. Still, the Commissioner suggested 
that the student, rather than the school district, must pay for his or her own legal representa-
tion. Id. 
88 Id. (providing that the students are entitled to “the right to request that witnesses at-
tend the hearing, and to question them (although some courts have held that in the school 
context, the student’s right to confront and cross-examine student witnesses may be out-
weighed by the need to protect them from possible retaliation)”). 
89 See id. 
90 See Leonard v. Sch. Comm. of Attleboro, 212 N.E.2d 468, 470–71 (Mass. 1965) (dis-
cussing the statutory history of judicial remedies for exclusion from school); Learock v. 
Putnam, 111 Mass. 499, 500–01 (Mass. 1873) (finding student may remedy unlawful expul-
sion by an action in tort); see also ch. 76, § 16 (allowing student who is unlawfully excluded 
from school to recover from school district or town in tort). 
91 See Leonard, 212 N.E.2d at 470–71; Learock, 111 Mass. at 500–01. 
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federal or state courts, to allow students to obtain counsel and cross-
examine witnesses in long-term suspension or expulsion proceedings.92 
II. Victims’ & Bullies’ Substantive Right to Education  
Under the Massachusetts Constitution 
 Outside of providing minimal procedural due process protections 
in disciplinary proceedings, the Massachusetts Constitution obligates 
the Commonwealth to educate children enrolled in its public schools.93 
Nevertheless, in Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester the SJC ex-
pressly held that this requirement laid out in the education clause does 
not guarantee individual students the fundamental right to educa-
tion.94 Instead, the court held that Massachusetts’s students must re-
ceive an equal opportunity to an adequate education.95 Further, the 
court held that students can forfeit their right to an adequate educa-
tion if their actions are detrimental to the safety of the school.96 Thus, 
the court maintained that students may be suspended or expelled un-
der such circumstances.97 
 The court in Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, however, indicated 
that the legislature and school officials have a duty to provide a safe and 
secure school environment that ensures all students have an equal op-
                                                                                                                      
92 See Newsome, 842 F.2d at 925; Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, § 10; see also Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H3/4(e) (2012). Under Section 37H3/4, “[a] student who has been 
suspended or expelled from school for more than 10 school days . . . shall have the right to 
present oral and written testimony, cross-examine witnesses and shall have the right to 
counsel” in a hearing with the superintendent. Ch. 71 § 37H3/4(e) (emphasis added). 
93 Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. V, § II (“[I]t shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, 
in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish . . . public schools and grammar 
schools in the towns . . . .”); see Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Mass. 
2005) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (citing McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 
615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993)). Every state constitution contains an education clause, 
but the Massachusetts Constitution serves as a model because it was the first constitution 
ratified by the states to include a provision for public education. Maura M. Pelham, Prom-
ulgating Preschool: What Constitutes a “Policy Decision” Under Hancock v. Commissioner of 
Education?, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 209, 214–15 (2005–2006). The U.S. Constitution, how-
ever, contains no such requirement. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Therefore, education is not a fundamental right protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 37, 40; see also U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”). 
94 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995). 
95 Id. at 1095–96. 
96 See id. at 1096 (citing McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 602). 
97 See id. at 1090, 1098 (upholding student expulsion for possession of lipstick knife); 
see also Nicholas B. v. Sch. Comm. of Worcester, 587 N.E.2d 211, 212–13 (Mass. 1992) (up-
holding student’s expulsion for assaulting another student). 
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portunity to be educated.98 At least in theory, then, the court’s reason-
ing indicates that the education clause constitutionally requires the leg-
islature and school officials to be proactive in preventing the victimiza-
tion of students by bullying.99 Otherwise, the victimized students could 
allege that the legislature or school district violated their substantive 
due process right to adequate education.100 Still, while students theo-
retically have a right to a safe and secure school environment, schools 
are: (1) given broad discretion to make policy choices about school 
safety; and (2) subject to minimal judicial scrutiny under either the 
federal or Massachusetts equal protection clause.101 
A. Historically Broad Policy Discretion 
 Courts have generally been reluctant to pass judgment on the wis-
dom or desirability of a school policy, even if the penalty for noncom-
pliance is exclusion from school.102 Much of this reluctance may be at-
tributed to the SJC’s interpretation of the separation of powers doc-
trine of the Massachusetts Constitution.103 In the advisory opinion 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d at 1096 (“McDuffy . . . suggests that 
the Legislature’s and school officials’ duty to provide children an adequate public educa-
tion includes the duty to provide a safe and secure environment in which all children can 
learn. Our prior decisions support the view that a student’s interest in a public education 
can be forfeited by violating school rules.”). 
99 See id. at 1096–97; Weddle, supra note 8, at 669. 
100 Cf. Weddle, supra note 8, at 666–70 (discussing the attempts of victims of bullying to 
convince courts that the school official’s conduct as it relates to bullying is a “state-created 
danger” that violates the student’s right to a safe school environment). But see Cady v. Ply-
mouth-Carver Reg’l Sch. Dist., 457 N.E.2d 294, 297 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (suggesting that 
“there are no readily ascertainable standards” that courts can establish to deal with disrup-
tive behavior, including bullying). 
101 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1156–57 (deferring to the executive and legislature to 
define how the state will fulfill its constitutional duty to provide adequate education); Su-
perintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d at 1097 (“[A]pply[ing] the lowest level of scru-
tiny, the rational basis test, to [the student’s] claim that [her expulsion] violated her right 
to substantive due process under the State Constitution.”). 
102 See Leonard v. Sch. Comm. of Attleboro, 212 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Mass. 1965); 
Hammond v. Town of Hyde Park, 80 N.E. 650, 650 (Mass. 1907) (construing school com-
mittee’s statutory power to make rules broadly). 
103 See Pelham, supra note 93, at 241–42, 244. Part 1, Article 30 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution construes the separation of powers: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the ex-
ecutive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of 
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or 
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men. 
Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXX. 
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Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, the SJC declared that the Massachu-
setts separation of powers clause is violated when one branch of gov-
ernment unduly restricts a core function of another branch.104 Yet, 
while it is a core function of the legislature to make laws, the legislature 
may delegate the implementation details of a legislative policy to a 
board or individual.105 Thus, because the state legislature has delegated 
broad power to school officials and boards, the Massachusetts courts 
have generally deferred to the decisions of school officials.106 
1. General Judicial Deference Towards School Policies 
 Early in the Commonwealth’s history the legislature delegated the 
“general charge and superintendence” of public schools to school 
committees.107 Courts quickly interpreted this statutory language as a 
broad delegation of disciplinary authority.108 For example, in Hodgkins v. 
Inhabitants of Rockport, the SJC held that due to the delegation of a “gen-
eral charge and superintendence,” the school committee’s decision to 
expel a student was not subject to revision by the court unless the com-
mittee was not acting in good faith.109 Likewise, in Leonard v. School Com-
mittee of Attleboro, the SJC upheld a school rule that barred a student from 
attending class solely because of the student’s hair length.110 The court 
presumed that the rule was “‘based upon mature deliberation and for 
the welfare of the community.’”111 Consequently, courts have upheld 
school rules so long as there is some rational basis for the rule.112 
 Further, courts have refused to reverse a disciplinary action unless 
the student can show that the suspending or expelling official acted 
                                                                                                                      
104 See 363 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Mass. 1977); Pelham, supra note 93, at 242. 
105 See Town of Arlington v. Bd. of Conciliation & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 919 
(Mass. 1976) (permitting legislature to delegate implementation details of legislative pol-
icy); Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 66 N.E. 607, 608 (Mass. 1903) (noting the univer-
sally adopted doctrine that the legislature cannot delegate the general power to make laws 
because that power was given only to the legislature by the constitution). 
106 See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054, 1057–59 
(Mass. 2002) (applying arbitrary and capricious review to determine validity of school 
rule); Leonard, 212 N.E.2d at 470, 472 (allowing school to bar students from class because 
of hair length). But see McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 520, 548, 555 (holding school finance system 
based on local property taxes violated the Massachusetts education clause because schools 
in poorer areas were grossly underfunded). 
107 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 543 n.68 (citation omitted). 
108 See, e.g., Hodgkins v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 105 Mass. 475, 475–76 (Mass. 1870). 
109 See id. (reasoning school committees are in the best position to judge whether the 
student’s misconduct affected the welfare of the school) (citation omitted). 
110 212 N.E.2d at 470, 472. 
111 See id. at 472 (quoting Antell v. Stokes, 191 N.E. 407, 409 (Mass. 1934)). 
112 See id. 
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arbitrarily or capriciously, constituting an abuse of discretion.113 Under 
arbitrary and capricious review, a court is permitted to reverse a school 
official’s disciplinary decision only when there is no rational explana-
tion for the decision and no reasonable mind could find that the origi-
nal decision was proper.114 Thus, courts have even affirmed suspensions 
and expulsions for conduct that was not prohibited in the school rule-
book and permitted disciplinary actions based solely on an inference 
drawn from the student’s alleged crime.115 
 2. A Limited Exception to Judicial Deference: School Finance 
 While the SJC generally adheres to a strict view of the separation 
of powers, its interpretation of school funding in McDuffy v. Secretary of 
the Executive Office of Education is the premier exception.116 In McDuffy, 
the court confronted the issue of whether the Massachusetts school 
finance system effectively denied students who lived in poor areas an 
adequate education.117 At the time, the Commonwealth’s school fi-
nance system relied on local real property taxes as the primary source 
of school funds.118 This meant that schools in areas with low real estate 
values were underfunded compared to schools in wealthy areas.119 Ul-
timately, the SJC held that the Commonwealth had failed its duty pur-
suant to the Massachusetts education clause to provide education to 
students from poor areas.120 
                                                                                                                      
113 See id. at 473; see also Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1055, 1057–59 
(applying arbitrary or capricious review to school decision to suspend students who had 
been charged with felonies). 
114 Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton , 767 N.E.2d at 1058. 
115 See id. at 1058–59 (holding school principal may draw an inference of detrimental 
effect based on the nature of the crime alone); Nicholas B., 587 N.E.2d at 212–13 (holding 
school committee’s conduct was not arbitrary or capricious merely because there was no 
disciplinary rule governing the conduct). 
116 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1161–62 (Cowin, J., concurring) (“The McDuffy court 
cast aside this separation of powers doctrine and improperly inserted a final layer of judi-
cial review on top of the public policy debate over education.”); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 
553–54; Alan Jay Rom, “McDuffy Is Dead; Long Live McDuffy!”: Fundamental Rights Without 
Remedies in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 21 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 111, 
125 (2006–2007). 
117 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 517. 
118 Id. at 522. 
119 Id. 
120 See id. at 553–54. In McDuffy, the students also alleged that the Commonwealth’s 
school finance system violated the state’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 522. Due to the 
fact that the court decided that the Commonwealth violated the education clause, the 
court did not address the equal protection issue. Id. at 522 n.15. 
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 The McDuffy court maintained that widespread education is both a 
duty and prerequisite of a republican form of government.121 Deciding 
that the Commonwealth had neglected its obligations under the educa-
tion clause, the court articulated seven broad “guidelines” to remedy 
the constitutional violation.122 Still, the court also reasoned that the 
duty to educate evolves over time.123 Thus, the court deferred to the 
executive and legislature to create a plan sufficient to meet the man-
date of the education clause and retained jurisdiction to determine 
whether, after a reasonable period of time, the plan was appropriate.124 
 Heeding the SJC’s call for action in McDuffy to create a plan suffi-
cient to meet the mandate of the education clause, the Massachusetts 
legislature quickly drafted the Education Reform Act (ERA).125 The 
ERA eliminated the school district’s dependence on local tax revenues 
and created a formula that would bring state aid to students in districts 
that were unable to raise enough funds.126 When students subsequently 
argued in Hancock v. Commissioner of Education that the ERA failed to 
meet the constitutional obligations articulated in McDuffy, the SJC ruled 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. at 537. The McDuffy court noted that the framers of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution believed a republican form of government must “indispensably” include “the 
education of youth, both in literature and in morals.” Id. at 536 (quoting John Adams, 
Thoughts on Government, in 4 The Works of John Adams 194 (C.F. Adams ed., 1851)). 
122 See id. at 554. Adopting the seven guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky, the SJC in McDuffy held that an educated child must possess: 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to 
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowl-
edge of economic, social, and political systems to enable students to make in-
formed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to 
enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, 
state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her 
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable 
each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) suf-
ficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or 
vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work in-
telligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to enable 
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in sur-
rounding states, in academics or in the job market. 
Id. (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)). 
123 See id. at 555. 
124 See id. at 555–56. 
125 See Education Reform Act, Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 69–71 (Supp. 1993); Rom, supra 
note 116, at 141 (noting the Education Reform Act was signed by the governor three days 
after the McDuffy decision). 
126 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1141 (Marshall, C.J., concurring); Rom, supra note 116, 
at 141. 
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in favor of the Commonwealth.127 Cautioning that it was not retreating 
from McDuffy, a plurality in the Hancock court reasoned that by passing 
the ERA, the legislative and executive engaged in the long-term process 
of providing every child with a high quality education.128 The plurality 
therefore limited the scope of judicial oversight imposed by McDuffy 
and declared that, in order for a student to successfully assert a viola-
tion of the education clause, the student must show that “the defen-
dants are acting in an arbitrary, nonresponsive, or irrational way to 
meet the constitutional mandate.”129 
B. Minimal Judicial Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause 
 Judicial review of substantive school policy decisions is minimal 
when a student alleges an equal protection violation under either the 
14th Amendment or the respective state constitution.130 Under federal 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has divided 
the scope of judicial review of state actions into three types of classifica-
tions: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate scrutiny; and (3) rational ba-
sis scrutiny.131 
 The Court applies strict scrutiny when a “fundamental right” or 
“suspect class” is implicated, and requires that the state demonstrate 
that its action is “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ govern-
ment interest.”132 Similarly, when discriminatory classifications based 
on gender or illegitimacy are implicated, the Court applies “intermedi-
ate scrutiny,” requiring the state to demonstrate that its action is “sub-
stantially related to an important governmental objective.”133 If none of 
the aforementioned heightened categories are implicated, the Court 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1137, 1139–40 (Marshall, C.J., concurring). 
128 Id. at 1140. 
129 Id. 
130 See Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d at 1097 (applying rational basis 
scrutiny). See generally Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the 
“Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1151 (1995) (discussing the evolu-
tion of equal protection clause litigation in school finance cases). 
131 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
132 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(2007) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding 
racial classifications in statutes are subject to strict scrutiny); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding right to vote is fundamental). 
133 Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. See generally Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718 (1982) (holding, after applying intermediate scrutiny, that state statute excluding men 
from enrolling in state sponsored professional nursing school violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause). 
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applies minimal rational basis scrutiny, whereby the state must only 
demonstrate that its action is “rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment purpose.”134 
 For example, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
the Court determined that there is no fundamental right to education 
under the United States Constitution, and therefore applied rational 
basis scrutiny to the Texas school finance system.135 Under federal ra-
tional basis review, the state action is presumed constitutional and the 
Court places the burden upon the plaintiff to “‘negate every conceiv-
able basis which might support [the disputed state action].’”136 There-
fore, by holding there is no fundamental right to education under the 
United States Constitution, the Rodriguez Court “essentially closed the 
door” to federal Equal Protection Clause challenges of school actions 
unless the claim is based on a student’s heightened classification.137 
 The judicial analysis under the Massachusetts Equal Protection 
Clause is similar to the federal system.138 Thus, in Doe v. Superintendent of 
the Schools of Worcester, once the SJC held that each individual student 
does not have a fundamental right to education, the court applied ra-
tional basis scrutiny to the school’s expulsion of a student.139 Accord-
ingly, as in the federal courts, unless a student’s claim is based on a 
fundamental right or the school’s action affects a student who is a 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Rom, supra note 116, at 166. 
135 411 U.S. at 37, 40. 
136 F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
137 See Doe v. Big Walnut Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 837 F. Supp. 2d 742, 752 (S.D. 
Ohio 2011) (holding that the substantive due process clause does not impose a constitu-
tional duty on the school to protect students from bullying by classmates); Heise, supra note 
130, at 1156–57 (noting that while the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
decision “essentially closed the door,” it was slightly left open by dicta that suggested the 
Constitution might guarantee a minimum amount of education to ensure a “meaningful 
opportunity to exercise other fundamental rights, such as free expression”); see also Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 710–11 (holding public school plans that chose to classify by race 
when making school assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
138 Rom, supra note 116, at 166–68 (noting that although Massachusetts has equal pro-
tection clause jurisprudence similar to the federal system, there are two significant differ-
ences). First, pursuant to the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment of 1976, Massachu-
setts courts apply strict scrutiny, rather than intermediate scrutiny, to gender based classifi-
cations. See id. at 166. Second, on rare occasions, courts apply what is known as “enhanced 
rational basis scrutiny,” where the government must show its actions have a “real and de-
monstrable,” rather than merely conceivable, connection to a legitimate government pur-
pose. See Lawrence Friedman, Ordinary and Enhanced Rational Basis Review in the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court: A Preliminary Investigation, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 415, 417–18 (2005–
2006); Rom, supra note 116, at 168. 
139 See 653 N.E.2d at 1097. 
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member of a suspect class, Massachusetts courts are likely to hold that a 
school’s disciplinary action does not violate the State’s Equal Protection 
Clause.140 
 As a result, because Massachusetts schools are given broad policy 
discretion that is subject to minimal judicial scrutiny, both bullies and 
their victims have little judicial recourse to address any harm to their 
substantive right to an adequate public school education.141 
III. Legislative Efforts to Protect Victims of Bullies 
 Most states attempted to combat bullying with anti-bullying statutes 
before Massachusetts developed a statewide policy.142 The typical early 
anti-bullying statutes, though, were ineffective in reducing incidents of 
bullying.143 As scholars have noted, victimized students and their peers 
are unlikely to report incidents of bullying because they fear retaliation 
or embarrassment.144 Yet early anti-bullying legislation focused on pun-
ishing specific reported instances of bullying without incentivizing 
schools to enforce policies that encourage the victims to report the bul-
lying.145 
 Nevertheless, without some anti-bullying legislation, schools are 
naturally reticent to make the necessary changes to identify and pre-
vent bullying.146 Prompted by public outcry over the suicides of stu-
                                                                                                                      
140 See id.; Weddle, supra note 8, at 671–72 (noting that many victims of bullying are 
unable to show that the school’s inaction to prevent bullying was because the student was a 
member of a suspect class); cf. Heise, supra note 130, at 1156–57 (noting that, by finding 
education is not a fundamental right, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez essentially 
closed the door on federal equal protection review). 
141 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1156–57 (Marshall, C.J., concurring); Superintendent of 
Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d at 1096–97; Cady, 457 N.E.2d at 297. 
142 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O (2010); Bully Police USA, supra note 16 (not-
ing that forty-nine states have passed anti-bullying laws and that all but eight states had 
passed anti-bullying laws before Massachusetts). 
143 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 555. 
144 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 645, 647–48, 679 (noting that victims cannot resist or 
end the torment of bullying if they fear the bully will later retaliate against them); Wayne 
N. Welsh, The Effects of School Climate on School Disorder, 567 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. 
Sci. 88, 91 (2000) (noting that fear and embarrassment contribute to the underreporting 
of school violence). 
145 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 555–57 (citing Weddle, supra note 8, at 673) (not-
ing that early state statutes provided little incentive to schools to actually enforce anti-
bullying policies). 
146 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 679 (discussing the difficulties of discovering bullying). See 
generally Laura Parker-Roerden et al., Governor’s Task Force on Hate Crimes, Direct 
from the Field: A Guide to Bullying Prevention (2007), available at http://www.mass. 
gov/eohhs/docs/dph/com-health/violence/bullying-prevent-guide.pdf (discussing reasons 
for the system-wide school failure to prevent bullying). 
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dents like Carl Walker-Hoover—and despite the early-perceived failures 
of anti-bullying legislation—in 2010 the Massachusetts legislature 
unanimously passed the Commonwealth’s first anti-bullying law.147 But 
unlike many earlier anti-bullying laws in other states, the Massachusetts 
law addresses school bullying by targeting both specific incidents of bul-
lying and the underlying reluctance of schools to implement a strong 
anti-bullying culture.148 
A. Underlying School Reluctance to Confront Bullying 
 While schools are certainly cognizant of the harms of bullying, for 
a myriad of reasons they are unable to implement successful bullying 
measures without strong legislative action.149 First, teachers may be 
prone to underestimate the severity of the bullying problem at their 
schools.150 Studies show that bullying is an “underground phenome-
non” because it typically occurs when intervening adults are not 
around to witness the violence.151 Victimized students often fail to ask 
for help because they either fear that intervention will incite more bul-
lying or are too humiliated to admit that they are weak or unpopular.152 
Similarly, non-bullied students are reluctant to intervene for fear that 
the bully will retaliate.153 Consequently, many instances of bullying are 
never reported to school officials.154 
 Furthermore, even when school officials learn of the bullying, they 
often either fail to report the incident to the school’s discipline adminis-
                                                                                                                      
147 See ch. 71, § 37O; Christensen, supra note 19, at 555; Peter Schworm, State Bill Tar-
geting Bullying Approved, Bos. Globe, Apr. 30, 2010, at A1. 
148 See Schworm, supra note 147, at A1 (noting that the law emphasizes both discipline 
and community wide anti-bullying education); see also Christensen, supra note 19, at 555–
57 (discussing the structure of many early anti-bullying laws). 
149 See Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 69–100 (suggesting in an official 
state report an assortment of bullying prevention tools before any anti-bullying laws were 
passed in Massachusetts); Christensen, supra note 19, at 558 (noting that effective anti-
bullying legislation is necessary to prevent bullying); Welsh, supra note 144, at 90 (citing a 
1993 survey of the National School Board Association that claims “[e]ighty-two percent of 
school district administrators reported that the problem of school violence had worsened 
in the previous five years, and 35 percent believed that incidents were more serious.”). 
150 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 650, 679. This was true even though schools readily 
admitted the increased severity and violence in schools. Id. at 650. 
151 See id. at 651, 679 (noting that bullying most likely occurs “behind the backs of 
adults who might intervene”). 
152 Id. at 647–48, 651. 
153 See id. at 648. 
154 See id. at 647–48, 651. 
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trator, or report it with significant errors.155 School disciplinary records 
reflect the ability of school officials to manage a safe school environ-
ment.156 Accordingly, teachers or school administrators who report nu-
merous incidents of bullying risk appearing incompetent and endanger 
their livelihood with each additional report.157 School officials who in-
tervene but do not report the bullying may also risk their positions if the 
bullying turns out to be more damaging than originally believed.158 As a 
result, school officials are incentivized not to intervene at all.159 
 Moreover, incidents of bullying are also underreported because 
many school officials are unaware of bullying’s inherent dangers.160 
Many school officials believe the commonly held myth that bullying is 
simply a part of growing up.161 Thus, unless an incident reaches the 
point of assault or theft, school officials often overlook bullying because 
they believe that bullying makes the abused children tougher.162 Oth-
erwise, some school officials—who are aware of both the dangers of 
bullying and the unlikelihood of witnessing the bullying—can be reluc-
tant to intervene because they fear that doing so will make the bully 
seek greater retribution when adults are not around.163 
 Finally, empirical research shows that a school’s ability to prevent 
bullying is primarily dependent upon the school faculty’s ability to 
maintain a safe school climate.164 Studies show that incidents of bully-
ing are highest where anti-bullying policies are inconsistently enforced 
or where the students do not believe the policy would be enforced.165 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 6 (“[S]tudents report that 71 per-
cent of teachers or other adults in the classroom ignore bullying incidents.”); Welsh, supra 
note 144, at 90 (discussing the prevalence of errors in school disciplinary records). 
156 See Welsh, supra note 144, at 90. 
157 See id. 
158 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 682. 
159 See id.; Welsh, supra note 144, at 90. 
160 See Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 6, 12–18 (discussing eight common 
myths about bullying like the perspectives that “bullying is just a part of growing up” or 
“boys will be boys”). 
161 See id. at 12; Weddle, supra note 8, at 650. 
162 Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 12; Weddle, supra note 8, at 650. In fact, 
research suggests that bullying creates the opposite effect. Parker-Roerden et al., supra 
note 146, at 12. Bullied children tend to isolate themselves from the rest of their class-
mates, resulting in lower self-esteem and a lack of a peer support structure. Id. 
163 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 651. 
164 Id. at 652 (defining school climate as “‘unwritten beliefs, values, and attitudes that 
become the style of interaction between students, teachers, and administrators’”) (quoting 
Welsh, supra note 144, at 89). 
165 See id. at 654; Welsh, supra note 144, at 93. 
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As a result, a school that sincerely tries to redress bullying would need 
its employees to embrace a significant cultural shift.166 
 Nevertheless, schools that do take a proactive approach towards 
bullying may appear to have a broad violence and bullying problem.167 
Such an appearance is undesirable and noticeable to parents and may 
ultimately undermine the school district’s political and financial sup-
port.168 It is therefore much easier for schools to only address bullying 
in the most “egregious situations,” thereby giving the illusion that the 
school is reprimanding dangerous bullies without exhibiting a broad 
underlying bullying problem.169 Consequently, since the judiciary rarely 
intervenes with school policy decisions, schools are naturally reluctant 
to openly tackle problems of bullying on their own.170 
B. The Massachusetts Anti-Bullying Law 
 The Massachusetts anti-bullying law can be separated into two 
parts.171 First, like many early anti-bullying laws, the Massachusetts law 
addresses the punishment of specific incidents of bullying.172 Then, to 
ensure effective bullying intervention and prevention, the law takes 
numerous steps to comprehensively reshape the culture of school bully-
ing.173 
1. Defining Bullying & Addressing Specific Bullying Incidents 
 The Massachusetts anti-bullying law broadly defines bullying to 
include written, verbal, or physical acts that cause a victim either physi-
                                                                                                                      
166 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 679. 
167 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 574; Weddle, supra note 8, at 677. 
168 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 574; Weddle, supra note 8, at 677. 
169 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 557, 574; Weddle, supra note 8, at 650, 676. 
170 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 557 (noting schools have “every incentive to refrain 
from drawing attention to bullying problems at their schools”); cf. Weddle, supra note 8, at 
682–95 (noting that schools are rarely held liable for failing to remedy school bullying). 
171 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H (2010) (“The superintendent of every school 
district shall publish the district’s policies pertaining to the conduct of teachers and stu-
dents . . . . The policies shall also prohibit bullying as defined in section 37O and shall 
include the student-related sections of the bullying prevention and intervention plan re-
quired by said section 37O.”); id. § 37O. 
172 See id. § 37O; Christensen, supra note 19, at 555. 
173 See ch. 71, § 37O; Press Release, Martha Coakley, Mass. Att’y Gen., On Second An-
niversary of Anti-Bullying Legislation, AG Coakley, Legislators Vow to Continue Efforts to 
Combat Bullying (May 2, 2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/ 
press-releases/2012/2012-05-02-anti-bullying-legislation-anniversary.html; see also Christen-
sen, supra note 19, at 555–58 (noting the need for anti-bullying legislation to reform 
school culture). 
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cal or emotional harm.174 Bullying is prohibited on school grounds, 
immediately adjacent to school grounds, at a school-sponsored or 
school related activity on or off school grounds, at school bus stops, in 
any school vehicle, and on any electronic device used by the school or 
school district.175 Apart from school, the law extends to non-school-
related activities and locations if the bullying: (1) creates a hostile 
school environment; (2) infringes on the victim’s rights at school; or 
(3) “materially and substantially” interferes with the education process 
or operation of a school.176 
 The law additionally mandates that every two years each school 
district must develop an extensive bullying prevention and intervention 
plan that gives clear guidance for how staff and students should re-
spond to bullying.177 The plans must establish, inter alia: (1) clear re-
porting procedures, including procedures to report bullying anony-
mously; (2) clear procedures that help the victimized children feel safe 
at school; (3) strategies to protect victims from further bullying and 
retaliation; (4) procedures that promptly notify the parents of victims; 
and (5) a strategy to provide counseling for the victims.178 
 The law also takes steps to ensure that alleged bullies are not un-
fairly or wrongly punished.179 First, the law prevents schools from disci-
plining alleged bullies solely because of an anonymous victim report.180 
Further, the law requires schools to discipline students who knowingly 
                                                                                                                      
174 Ch. 71, § 37O. As defined by Section 37O: 
“Bullying,” the repeated use by one or more students of a written, verbal or 
electronic expression or a physical act or gesture or any combination thereof, 
directed at a victim that: (i) causes physical or emotional harm to the victim 
or damage to the victim’s property; (ii) places the victim in reasonable fear of 
harm to himself or of damage to his property; (iii) creates a hostile environ-
ment at school for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights of the victim at 
school; or (v) materially and substantially disrupts the education process or 
the orderly operation of a school. 
Id. § 37O. Though the focus of this Note is public schools, the Massachusetts anti-bullying 
law also applies to charter, non-public, approved private day or residential, and collabora-
tive schools. See id. 
175 Id. § 37O(b)(i). 
176 Id. § 37O(b)(ii). 
177 Id. § 37O(c)–(d). 
178 Id. § 37O(d); see, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Sample 
Bullying Prevention and Intervention Incident Reporting Form, available at http:// 
www.doe.mass.edu/bullying/ModelPlan_appxA.pdf (enumerating procedures when a bully-
ing incident is reported). 
179 See ch. 71, § 37O(d). 
180 Id. § 37O(d)(iii) (providing that “no disciplinary action shall be taken against a 
student solely on the basis of an anonymous report”). 
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make false allegations of bullying, thereby deterring students from 
making up or exaggerating abuse.181 Finally, school plans must include 
a range of disciplinary actions to take against bullies based on the sever-
ity of the bullying incident.182 A school official must determine the de-
gree of discipline only after balancing “the need for [student] account-
ability with the need to teach appropriate behavior.”183 The law thus 
requires schools to respond to bullying, while theoretically preventing 
them from strictly adhering to ineffective and potentially harmful zero 
tolerance policies.184 
2. Reshaping Anti-Bullying Culture Through Community Involvement 
 Like many anti-bullying laws, the Massachusetts law requires every 
school staff member to report any bullying incidents.185 To encourage 
schools to implement effective anti-bullying policies, the Department of 
Education is required to publish and distribute a model bullying pre-
vention plan.186 This measure has been criticized because schools may 
formally adopt the model yet fail to implement the policies.187 When 
                                                                                                                      
181 Id. § 37O(d)(ix); The Governor’s Acad., Anti-Bullying Policy and Interven-
tion Plan 1, 5–6 (2012), available at http://www.thegovernorsacademy.org/uploaded/ 
Student_Life/Student_Handbook/Anti-Bullying_Policy_and_Intervention_Plan_3413.pdf 
(noting that when establishing an anti-bullying policy in response to the Massachusetts law, 
false or exaggerated allegations are not tolerated because they can be extremely damaging to 
innocent students). 
182 Ch. 71, § 37O(d)(x). 
183 Id. § 37O(d)(v). 
184 See id. § 37O(d); Hanson, supra note 27, at 315–17, 323–24 (discussing the negative 
effects of zero-tolerance policies and likening the approach to child abuse). While the law 
aims for schools not to use zero-tolerance policies, in reality, schools are turning to police 
arrests for even the smallest school discipline issue. See Hanson, supra note 27, at 315–17; 
Robin L. Dahlberg, Arrested Futures: The Criminalization of School Discipline in Massachusetts’ 
Three Largest School Districts, ACLU of Massachusetts 9, 19–21, http://www.aclu. 
org/files/assets/maarrest_reportweb.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (noting that schools 
are now using on-site police officers to arrest students to deal with school discipline that 
has been classically addressed by school staff). 
185 Ch. 71, § 37O(g); see Weddle, supra note 8, at 675. Staff members are required to 
report the bullying to the principal or a designated school official who overseas bullying. 
Ch. 71, § 37O(g). 
186 Ch. 71, § 37O(j); see, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 
Model Bullying Prevention and Intervention Plan (2013), available at http://www. 
doe.mass.edu/bullying/BPIP.pdf [hereinafter Model Bullying Plan]. 
187 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 557 (noting that schools have every incentive to 
merely adopt an anti-bullying policy, rather than change their culture, and thus only en-
force bullying in egregious situations); Weddle, supra note 8, at 676 (implying that while 
model plans can help encourage conversation, they are often used as a crutch so that 
schools do not have to engage in time consuming and difficult community conversations 
about bullying). 
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this happens, a school can technically comply with the anti-bullying law 
without drawing attention to the severity of bullying on its campus.188 
 The Massachusetts anti-bullying law addresses this issue by requir-
ing schools to involve the entire educational community in the policy 
making.189 First, before adopting or making any prospective changes to 
the school district’s bullying prevention plan, the district must seek in-
put from the students, parents, local law enforcement, and overall edu-
cational community.190 
 In addition, every school must incorporate into the curriculum of 
each grade an age-appropriate evidence-based instruction on bully pre-
vention.191 Current research advocates that classroom bully prevention 
curricula include activities that empower students to know what to do— 
including seeking adult assistance—when they witness bullying.192 
Moreover, schools must educate parents about the dynamics of bully-
ing.193 Hence, under the law, parents are advised on how to reinforce 
the schools evidence-based anti-bullying curriculum.194 
 Finally, every school staff member must receive ongoing profes-
sional anti-bullying training.195 Ongoing training is meant to ensure 
that all staff members are able to pierce the school’s “underground” 
bullying culture by providing them with tools to create a safe school 
climate.196 Given each of these requirements, Massachusetts has clearly 
                                                                                                                      
188 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 557; Weddle, supra note 8, at 676–77. 
189 See ch. 71, § 37O(c)–(d); Weddle, supra note 8, at 655–56 (suggesting that when the 
entire community is involved there is a shared sense of ownership to the bullying problem 
and a greater likelihood to change the school climate). Professor Weddle praised a similar 
approach taken by Oklahoma, which provided for methods to involve the school commu-
nity in bullying prevention, because that approach ensured that model policies are not just 
photocopied and distributed to the public. See Weddle, supra note 8, at 676–77 (citing 
Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A) (Supp. 2004)). 
190 Ch. 71, § 37O(d). Aside from students, parents and guardians, and law enforce-
ment, the statute requires the school to seek input from professional support personnel, 
school volunteers, administrators, community representatives, and school staff. Id. 
191 Id. § 37O(c); see, e.g., Model Bullying Plan, supra note 186, at 6–7. 
192 Model Bullying Plan, supra note 186, at 6–7. 
193 Ch. 71, § 37O(d). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.; Weddle, supra note 8, at 679; see Model Bullying Plan, supra note 186, at 4. 
This ongoing staff training must include, inter alia: (1) age-specific strategies to prevent 
and effectively intervene in bullying incidents; (2) information that conveys the “complex 
interaction and power differential” between bullies and victims; and (3) bullying research 
findings that include information about which students are particularly at risk for bullying 
and how students engage in cyber-bullying. Ch. 71, § 37O(d). To ensure that impoverished 
schools can afford the staff training, the Commonwealth must provide at least one training 
option at no cost to every school district. Id.; see Christensen, supra note 19, at 557 (noting 
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taken extensive steps to combat the underlying reluctance of schools to 
address school bullying and therefore help create effective anti-bullying 
climates throughout the Commonwealth.197 
IV. Awarding Bullies Rights at the Expense of Protecting 
Victims 
 Research has shown that once students are suspended or expelled 
they are more likely to quit going to school entirely.198 Those students 
then enter into the real world as undereducated and unskilled young 
adults who are precluded from the same opportunities as their former 
classmates.199 Consequently, many of the suspended or expelled stu-
dents turn towards crime—often arrested within one year of the sus-
pension.200 Alleged bullies should therefore be entitled to some proce-
dural protections before they lose their opportunity to receive an ade-
quate education.201 In other words, since the judiciary rarely intervenes 
in school disciplinary decisions or finds that students are entitled to 
more than minimal procedural protections, legislative measures to pro-
tect alleged bullies are essential.202 
                                                                                                                      
that many anti-bullying laws fail to provide training to teachers because they do not pro-
vide funding to the schools). 
197 See ch. 71, § 37O; Christensen, supra note 19, at 557, 574; Weddle, supra note 8, at 
652, 679. 
198 See Hanson, supra note 27, at 330–31 (discussing the negative effects of school sus-
pensions). Professor Hanson notes that, depending on the time of the expulsion, the stu-
dent can be out of school for over a full calendar year. Id. at 330; see also Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 71, § 37H3/4(f) (2012) (limiting suspensions up to ninety school days, which is equiva-
lent to eighteen full calendar weeks without school holidays). As a result, it can be very 
difficult to get students back into class with younger classmates, especially if the student 
was psychologically damaged from the school’s discipline. See Hanson, supra note 27 at 
330–31. 
199 See Hanson, supra note 27 at 330–31. 
200 See id. (noting that studies have shown students that students who are expelled have 
an increased likelihood to “get into trouble with the law and get arrested within one 
year”); see also T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (noting that bullies in general are more likely than non-bullies to commit a felony in 
the future and that one study found that “60 percent of boys identified as bullies in grades 
six to nine had at least one conviction by age 24 . . . a four-fold increase in the level of 
criminality over that of non-bullies”). 
201 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (implying that for long-term suspen-
sions all students should be entitled to more formal procedures than notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard); Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095–
96 (Mass. 1995) (holding all Massachusetts students are entitled to an equal opportunity to 
receive an adequate education); Hanson, supra note 27, at 293 (noting the importance of 
receiving an education in the twenty-first century). 
202 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (stopping short of requiring schools to provide trial type 
protections in expulsion proceedings); Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 767 
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 Chapter 71, Section 37H3/4 of the Massachusetts General Laws, 
enacted to limit the expansion of the school-to-prison pipeline, protects 
alleged bullies by granting them the right to confront their accusers 
with the assistance of counsel.203 Nonetheless, entitling alleged bullies 
to these procedural protections causes numerous harmful effects to 
victims, undermining the Commonwealth’s efforts to create effective 
anti-bullying school climates.204 Amending the law so victims may be 
interviewed by neutral third-parties away from the disciplinary hearing 
will alleviate the potentially traumatic harm to victims, while ensuring 
the fairness of the alleged bully’s disciplinary hearing.205 
A. The Importance of Examining the Victim Before a Long-Term Suspension 
 Ensuring a fair disciplinary hearing is dependent upon the exami-
nation of the victim, particularly when the discipline concerns bully-
ing.206 Schools rely upon the reports of victims, school officials, non-
victimized students, and parents to reveal specific incidents of bully-
ing.207 Bullies are often successful at tormenting their victims for long 
periods of time precisely because the bullying is done away from inter-
vening adults.208 School officials and parents therefore are unlikely to 
                                                                                                                      
N.E.2d 1054, 1057–59 (Mass. 2002) (applying arbitrary and capricious review to determine 
validity of school rule); Mossman, supra note 39, at 630–31 (calling for a “bright-line de-
termination” of the right to counsel, but noting such cases never reach court). 
203 Ch. 71, § 37H3/4(e) (“At the hearing, the student shall have the right to present 
oral and written testimony, cross-examine witnesses and shall have the right to counsel.”); 
see Young, supra note 30 (noting the law requires schools to consider alternatives before 
suspending or expelling a student). 
204 See Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting 
the need to protect a student’s anonymity to report violence at school); Weddle, supra note 
8, at 652, 679; Coakley, supra note 173 (noting that the anti-bullying law is meant to com-
prehensively reshape the culture of bullying in schools). 
205 See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he procedures em-
ployed in a disciplinary action must be tested by the extent to which they comport with the 
requirement of fundamental fairness.”); Alison Cunningham & Pamela Hurley, Hear-
say Evidence and Children 12 (2007), available at http://www.lfcc.on.ca/6_Hearsay 
Evidence.pdf (noting that Sweden uses a neutral third-party to interview child witnesses); 
cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (holding that emotionally abused children 
can testify at their abuser’s criminal trial without face-to-face confrontation with their 
abuser). 
206 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12; Weddle, supra note 8, at 648, 651. 
207 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O (2010) (requiring school officials to report inci-
dents of bullying, and providing parents with information about the schools anti-bullying 
curriculum); see also Model Bullying Plan, supra note 186, at 6–7 (emphasizing students 
to seek adult assistance when they witness bullying); Parent’s Worst Nightmare, supra note 2 
(noting that Carl Walker-Hoover’s mother reported the bullying to the school). 
208 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 651. 
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be around when the bullying occurs.209 In addition, non-victimized stu-
dents avoid bullying incidents because they do not want to get the 
bully’s attention.210 Consequently, parents, school officials, and non-
bullied students generally only have secondhand or incomplete knowl-
edge of the bullying.211 As a result, in many cases the disciplining school 
official cannot accurately gauge the credibility and severity of the bully-
ing without hearing the victim’s full account.212 
 Similarly, very few students accused of severe bullying can bear the 
legal risks of presenting their side of the story.213 Any statement students 
make at a disciplinary hearing can be used against them in a later 
criminal prosecution.214 In other words, while some bullies may be per-
suaded to speak at a school hearing because they fear the school official 
may infer guilt from their silence, many bullies will refuse to speak be-
cause they fear self-incrimination.215 Thus, in many cases the only mean-
ingful way to challenge a bullying allegation is to confront the victim.216 
                                                                                                                      
209 See id. at 651–52 (noting that the majority of bullying occurs at school and therefore 
that parents may feel powerless to change the situation because they are not around). 
210 See id. at 648. 
211 See id. at 648, 651–52; see also Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248, 250 
(D.N.H. 2002) (holding that the hearing was unfair because it was based on the police 
captain’s second hand hearsay and unreliable student accounts). 
212 See ch. 71, § 37O(d) (requiring school officials to measure the severity of the bully-
ing before disciplining the student); Newsome, 842 F.2d at 925 (denying right to cross-
examination because the school official could properly gauge the credibility of the victim’s 
accusation). 
213 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 581–82; Russell Goldman, Teens Indicted After Allegedly Taunting Girl 
Who Hanged Herself, ABC News, Mar. 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ 
TheLaw/teens-charged-bullying-mass-girl-kill/story?id=10231357 (noting that students have 
been indicted for bullying). 
214 See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 n.9 (Mass. 1992) (noting that 
a school official should warn the student that any statement the student makes could be 
later used as evidence against the student in a criminal proceeding); Boston Public 
Schools Code of Conduct 26 (2010), available at http://www.bostonpublicschools. 
org/files/Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf [hereinafter Boston School Code] (stating that 
the hearing officer should warn students that their statements may be used against them in 
a later civil or criminal court). 
215 See C.O. v. M.M., 815 N.E.2d 582, 589 (Mass. 2004) (holding that an adverse inference 
may be drawn against student defendant in an “abuse prevention” proceeding, even if crimi-
nal proceedings are pending, so long as silence is not the sole basis of the complaint); Gold-
man, supra note 213 (reporting the indictments of nine bullies after the victim committed 
suicide); see also ch. 71, § 37O(g)(i) (encouraging principals to report potentially criminal 
bullying to the police). Like school hearings, abuse prevention proceedings are intended to 
be informal. C.O., 815 N.E.2d at 591; see Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. Moreover, the Massachusetts 
judiciary is reticent to intervene in school disciplinary decisions. See Superintendent of Schs. of 
Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1057. Thus, though the two proceedings are not identical, the ad-
verse inference doctrine may extend to school hearings. See C.O., 815 N.E.2d at 589, 591; 
Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1057. But see Boston School Code, supra 
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B. Harmful Effects of Subjecting a Victim to Cross-Examination by Counsel 
 Given that in many cases the victim is the only person who can at-
test to the severity of the bullying, the trustworthiness or reliability of the 
victim’s claim is paramount.217 Depending on the age of the child and 
the types of questions asked, however, counsel can undermine a victim’s 
reliability merely by repeating similar questions within the same cross-
examination.218 By repeating questions, a common cross-examination 
tactic, abused children may perceive that they are expected to give a dif-
ferent, untruthful answer.219 Studies show that abused children may do 
this for two reasons: (1) after the question is repeated, the children be-
lieve their first answer was incorrect; or (2) the children want to change 
their answer to make the adult questioner happy.220 Moreover, school 
disciplinary officials, in a position similar to jurors, may not realize the 
effect that the repeated questioning had on the child.221 Although this 
effect is mitigated when the disciplining school officials know firsthand 
if the victim is reliable, the final decision is made by the superinten-
dent—someone who is less likely to have had previous contact with the 
victim.222 As a result, adept cross-examination by counsel can obfuscate 
the severity of the bullying, thereby increasing the likelihood that bullies 
are under-punished.223 
                                                                                                                      
note 214, at 26 (stating that the hearing officer should warn students that their statements 
may be used against them in a later civil or criminal court). 
216 See Johnson, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 249–50 (holding due process is violated when stu-
dents have no meaningful opportunity to be heard). 
217 See id.; Weddle, supra note 8, at 648, 651. 
218 See Thomas D. Lyon, Applying Suggestibility Research to the Real World: The Case of Re-
peated Questions, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 97, 97, 108 (2002). Still, Professor Lyon ar-
gues not to exaggerate the risks of repeated questions for older children. See id. at 110. 
219 See id. at 106. 
220 Id. 
221 See id. at 104–05. 
222 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H3/4(e) (2012) (granting the student the right to 
appeal the suspension to the superintendent, but warning that the decision “shall be the 
final decision of the school district”); Newsome, 842 F.2d at 924 (reasoning that the value of 
cross-examination is mitigated by the strength of the school official’s judgment). 
223 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O(d) (2010) (requiring schools to include a range of 
disciplinary options based on the severity of the bullying); Lyon, supra note 218, at 121–23 
(noting that repeated questions may increase inconsistency but not necessarily inaccuracy). 
Even if the abused child is accurate that the bullying occurred, the inconsistent account of 
the severity of the bullying undermines the disciplining process. See ch. 71, § 37O(d); Lyon, 
supra note 218, at 121–23. 
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 When bullies are under-punished, schools officials give victims the 
impression that they are unable to protect them from abuse.224 The 
under-punishment thus undercuts the trust victimized students must 
have in adults to overcome their fears of embarrassment and potential 
retaliation.225 Consequently, cross-examination that leads to under-
punishing the bully will deter victims from reporting the abuse, inevita-
bly resulting in more torment for the victim and an overall more dan-
gerous school climate.226 
 On the other hand, cross-examination that obfuscates a victim’s 
credibility can also create a more dangerous bullying climate by creating 
a school-wide perception that the bully was arbitrarily over-punished.227 
Many school administrators err towards criminalizing a student’s mis-
conduct rather than rehabilitating the misconduct at school, regardless 
of evidence that the student’s misconduct was minor or that the allega-
tions were false.228 In such situations, the hearing officer’s discipline of 
the bully may remain severe even when the bully’s counsel successfully 
downplays the severity of the bullying, thereby resulting in the percep-
tion throughout the school that the bully has been arbitrarily over-
punished.229 
 When bullies are arbitrarily over-punished, the disproportionate 
discipline shows that the school can “lord [its] power” over its students 
                                                                                                                      
224 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 645 (noting that victims cannot resist or end the tor-
ment of bullying if they fear the bully will retaliate against them). 
225 See id. at 651 (noting that student victims tend not to trust adults enough to ask for 
help if they fear the help will lead to retaliation); Welsh, supra note 144, at 91 (arguing that 
victims may also not report bullying because they are embarrassed). 
226 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 559–60, 564; Weddle, supra note 8, at 645, 651; 
Welsh, supra note 144, at 91. 
227 See Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 6, 12–18; Archer, supra note 27, at 
868–69; Christensen, supra note 19, at 549; Weddle, supra note 8, at 680. 
228 See Archer, supra note 27, at 868–69 (noting that the recent trend by school officials 
across the country to “crack down” on the behavior of students—rather than attempt to 
rehabilitate the students in a school environment—has resulted in an increase of student 
suspensions and expulsions compared to earlier generations for what many would con-
sider nonviolent behavior); Hanson, supra note 27, at 329 (noting that actions that may be 
considered childish acts, like having a pager at school, have been treated like criminal acts 
that merited suspension); see also Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 570–76 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(pointing out that school board expelled student for possession of a knife in his car, even 
though evidence at school hearing showed student had no knowledge of the knife because 
another student had planted it there); Weddle, supra note 8, at 680 (noting how, at one 
school, “[a] six-year-old was suspended for offering a classmate a lemon drop because the 
teacher did not know what the candy was”). 
229 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 680 (noting how administrators abandon common 
sense punishments when school violence is implicated and often err on the side of “dra-
conian” zero-tolerance punishments). 
144 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:111 
in the same way that bullies do.230 In other words, the school becomes a 
bully and the bullies become the victims.231 Once victimized, bullies 
often feel justified in treating their victims in the same way the school 
treated them and may turn even more violent against their victims.232 
 Moreover, over-punishing bullies can deter much of the school 
community from reporting the incidents.233 When students are over-
punished, teachers and non-bullied students face an unenviable catch-
22: either report the bullying and subject the students to overly harsh 
punishment, or fail to report the bullying and subject the victim to fur-
ther torment.234 Given that many people underestimate the traumatic 
effects of bullying, some school officials and students will undoubtedly 
choose not to report the bullying.235 Cross-examination that leads to 
arbitrary over-punishing, therefore, can create an even more dangerous 
bullying climate.236 
  Finally, even assuming that the bullies are appropriately pun-
ished, the cross-examination can serve as yet another avenue for bullies 
to torment their victims.237 Victims must already overcome their fear of 
retaliation and embarrassment in order to report the bullying.238 Ex-
tensive research indicates that this fear is difficult to overcome; many 
victims of abuse have the natural inclination to try to avoid thinking 
about their abusers.239 Likewise, many abused children are particularly 
vulnerable to the pressures of speaking in intimidating forums where 
                                                                                                                      
230 Cf. id. at 680–81 (noting that zero-tolerance approach to bullying, where the pun-
ishment is often unjust or disproportionate, confirms to children that some groups can 
abuse others without any consequences). 
231 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 548–49 (noting that bullies who are punished with 
severe reprimands tend to feel like victims); Weddle, supra note 8, at 681. 
232 See Christensen, supra note 19, at 549 (noting that bullies often feel powerless and 
resort to extreme violence when school officials do not listen to their side of the story). 
233 See id. at 559–60 (citing Weddle, supra note 8, at 682) (noting the reluctance of 
teachers and students to report bullying if the punishment is excessive or unjust). 
234 See id. at 559–60, 564. 
235 See id.; see also Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 6, 12–18 (discussing eight 
common myths that cause many to underestimate the traumatic effects of bullying). 
236 See Parker-Roerden et al., supra note 146, at 6, 12–18; Christensen, supra note 19, 
at 549; Weddle, supra note 8, at 680–81. 
237 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 645 (noting that bullying is a form of child abuse); 
Goodhue, supra note 36, at 498 (describing how child abuse victims forced to testify in 
court in front of the accused are often re-victimized). 
238 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 645; Welsh, supra note 144, at 91. 
239 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 651 (stating the reasons that bullying victims fail to ask for 
help); see also Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475 (analyzing how symptoms of trauma are 
exacerbated in victims of domestic violence when they are forced to repeatedly come to court 
or discuss the abuse because the victims often try to avoid thinking about the abuse). 
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they must confront their abusers face-to-face.240 Given these vulnerabili-
ties, through cross-examination, bullies get one last opportunity to 
bully their victims, thereby forcing the victims to relive the abuse.241 By 
permitting bullies to cross-examine their victims with counsel, Section 
37H3/4 undermines the necessary legislative efforts to combat bully-
ing.242 
C. An Alternative Approach That Protects Both Bullies & Victims 
 Before Section 37H3/4’s enactment, schools could refuse an ac-
cused student’s request for the victim to appear and be cross-examined 
at a disciplinary hearing.243 Bolstered by court decisions like Newsome v. 
Batavia Local School District, schools could justify keeping school disci-
plinary proceedings relatively informal in order to protect student 
anonymity and encourage reporting of school violence.244 Nonetheless, 
informal disciplinary proceedings have immense consequences for ac-
cused bullies.245 Without an opportunity to examine the victim, alleged 
bullies may be disproportionately punished for the severity of their ac-
tions.246 Considering that school officials currently err towards suspen-
                                                                                                                      
240 See Goodhue, supra note 36, at 516–17 (“[C]hildren’s cognitive and emotional de-
velopment make them particularly vulnerable to the pressures of testifying in a forum 
which to them is both alien and intimidating.”); cf. Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475 
(noting that trauma may be intensified by triggering flashbacks, when an abused victim has 
to testify in front of her accuser). 
241 See Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475 (stating that testifying makes victims relive 
the trauma); Weddle, supra note 8, at 645 (describing how bullying is meant to intimidate, 
harass, or frighten the victim). 
242 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H3/4(e) (2012); Christensen, supra note 19, at 
558; Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475 (noting that testifying makes victims relive the 
trauma); Coakley, supra note 173. 
243 See ch. 71, § 37H3/4(e); Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, § 10 (advising, but not 
requiring, schools to allow students to cross-examine witnesses); Boston School Code, 
supra note 214, at 32 (reserving the right, before the enactment of Section 37H3/4, to 
reject the calling of student witnesses if the identification or presence of the student would 
endanger their physical safety). 
244 See Newsome, 842 F.2d at 924–25. Additionally, schools likely preferred informal dis-
ciplinary hearings because they allowed schools to avoid the monetary costs of extensive 
disciplinary hearings and excessive attorney’s fees. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (warning that 
imposing “even truncated trial-type procedures” might overwhelm school resources); Os-
teen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that entitling students to a law-
yer may require schools to hire their own expensive lawyer). 
245 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O(d) (2010); Lyon, supra note 218, at 121–23; 
Weddle, supra note 8, at 680. 
246 See ch. 71, § 37O(d) (requiring school officials to determine the severity of the bul-
lying before punishment); Archer, supra note 27, at 868–69 (noting the misuse of school 
suspensions and expulsions for typical, nonviolent, childhood behavior); Lyon, supra note 
218, at 121–23 (highlighting the risk of inconsistency); Weddle, supra note 8, at 680 (argu-
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sions and expulsions when they punish students for committing vio-
lence like bullying, such disproportionate discipline greatly increases 
the likelihood that the disciplined students will drop out of school and 
wind up in jail.247 Thus, repealing Section 37H3/4 to allow schools to 
control which witnesses appear at disciplinary hearings is inadvisable.248 
 Instead, the harms that arise from undermining victim credibility 
through cross-examination can be alleviated if the victim is questioned 
outside of the disciplinary proceeding by a neutral third-party.249 The 
Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig allowed a similar approach for 
abused children witnesses in formal criminal trials.250 In Craig, the 
Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
does not categorically prevent child witnesses of sexual abuse from tes-
tifying through a one-way closed circuit television outside of the pres-
ence of the defendant.251 The Court maintained that the primary safe-
guard provided by the right to confrontation—enhancing accuracy of 
criminal trials by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully impli-
cate an innocent person—is protected only when the accused is given 
an opportunity to cross-examine and the fact-finder can observe the 
witness’s demeanor.252 
 The Court stressed that the Confrontation Clause may only be 
overcome when the procedure is necessary to further an important state 
interest.253 General trauma created by appearing in a courtroom, how-
ever, is not enough to overcome the Confrontation Clause.254 To protect 
children from such trauma, the Court reasoned that the child could in-
                                                                                                                      
ing that school violence can cause administrators to abandon common sense punish-
ments). 
247 See Archer, supra note 27, at 868–69 (noting the increased likelihood of students 
who are suspended to become involved with the criminal justice system, use drugs, and 
drop out of school); Hanson, supra note 27, at 330–31 (stating that students who are sus-
pended are likely to be in jail within one year); Weddle, supra note 8, at 680; Walker, supra 
note 22 (discussing the recent use of zero-tolerance policies in Massachusetts in response 
to school violence). 
248 See Archer, supra note 27, at 868–69; Hanson, supra note 27, at 330–31; Lyon, supra 
note 218, at 121–23; Weddle, supra note 8, at 680. 
249 See Cunningham & Hurley, supra note 205, at 12 (noting that some countries use 
a similar approach for cross-examining children in criminal proceedings). 
250 See 497 U.S. at 855–56. 
251 Id. at 840, 855; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against him . . . .”). 
252 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846, 851–52. 
253 Id. at 852. 
254 See id. at 856 (reasoning the trauma must be caused by the actual presence of the 
defendant). 
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stead be permitted to testify in a less intimidating setting than a court-
room, provided that the defendant is present during the testimony.255 
 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the state’s interest in protect-
ing the welfare of children coupled with the growing body of evidence 
documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims 
who testify can outweigh a defendant’s constitutional right to confronta-
tion.256 The Court recognized that when face-to-face confrontation 
causes significant emotional distress in a child witness, the confrontation 
could actually disserve the Confrontation Clause’s truth-seeking func-
tion.257 Thus, the Court held that where it is necessary to protect a child 
witness from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the defen-
dant’s presence, face-to-face confrontation may be denied.258 
 The remedy that the Court applied in Craig should be extended to 
the cross-examination of bullied victims in school disciplinary hear-
ings.259 As noted by the Craig court, the truth seeking process is hin-
dered when victims are exposed to more trauma while testifying.260 Fol-
lowing this reasoning, the trauma that victims experience by appearing 
in a school disciplinary hearing can be at least partially alleviated if the 
victim is allowed to testify in a more comfortable forum.261 The Con-
frontation Clause, however, does not apply to school disciplinary hear-
ings and, unlike the Clause, Section 37H3/4 does not grant a general 
right to confront accusers.262 Instead, Section 37H3/4 entitles students 
to cross-examine witnesses at the disciplinary hearing, thereby implying 
that schools have no right to require bullies to examine their victims 
                                                                                                                      
255 See id. 
256 See id. at 855–56. 
257 Id. at 857 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that face-to-face confrontation may overwhelm children from testifying accu-
rately and therefore undermine the “truth-finding function of the trial itself”)). 
258 See id. 
259 See id. at 855–56; Christensen, supra note 19, at 546 (likening bullying to child 
abuse); Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475 (noting that testifying may cause abused victims 
to relive the trauma). 
260 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 856–57 (implying that if children are not overwhelmed by the 
trial’s setting, they will be more accurate and reliable witnesses). 
261 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 856; Goodhue, supra note 36, at 516–17 (noting that abused 
children are particularly vulnerable when they testify in intimidating forums). 
262 See U.S. Const. amend. VI. (granting “the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him” only in “criminal prosecutions”) (emphasis added). Compare Craig, 497 
U.S. at 849 (holding that, in general, “the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for 
face-to-face confrontation at trial”) (citation omitted), with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, 
§ 37H3/4(e) (2012) (granting the right to cross-examination “at the [disciplinary] hear-
ing”). 
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elsewhere.263 Accordingly, amending Section 37H3/4 to allow neutral 
third-parties to cross-examine victims is necessary to permit victims to 
present their side of the story in a less intimidating setting.264 
 Directly applying the holding in Craig, however, is not enough to 
prevent the cross-examination of victims from undermining the imple-
mentation of an effective anti-bullying climate.265 The Craig Court main-
tained that any out-of-court witnesses must still be cross-examined.266 
Consequently, following Craig would change the forum but not prevent 
the victims from reliving the abuse through cross-examination.267 
 To ensure that disciplinary proceedings are truth-seeking without 
subjecting the victim to unnecessary trauma, the law must limit the abil-
ity of the bully’s counsel to unfairly undermine the credibility of the vic-
tim by asking repeated questions using traditional cross-examination 
techniques.268 This can be achieved by requiring a neutral third-party to 
question the victim with the questions developed by the bully’s attor-
ney.269 A neutral examiner, preferably one who is experienced at discuss-
ing abuse with victimized children, could create an inquisitorial—as op-
posed to adversarial—atmosphere that encourages the bullied child to 
speak accurately about the severity of the bullying.270 This process would 
still allow the accused bully’s counsel to amend its list of questions dur-
ing the examination to account for any inconsistencies in the victim’s 
                                                                                                                      
263 See ch. 71, § 37H3/4(e). 
264 See id.; Craig, 497 U.S. at 856–57. 
265 See Weddle, supra note 8, at 651 (noting victims will not report bullying if they think 
adults will not intervene or be able to stop the bullying); Lyon, supra note 218, at 121–23 
(stating that children often change their answers when asked similar questions, thereby 
undermining the child’s credibility); see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 857. 
266 See 497 U.S. at 846. 
267 See id. at 846, 857; Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475 (noting that victims who tes-
tify about the abuse may experience further trauma); Weddle, supra note 8, at 651. 
268 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846 (reasoning that confrontation helps to ensure the trial 
seeks the truth); Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475; Lyon, supra note 218, at 121–23. 
269 See Cunningham & Hurley, supra note 205, at 12 (noting the use of neutral third-
parties during the video-taped cross-examination of children under twelve using questions 
posed by the defense). 
270 See id.; see also Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (cautioning that school disciplinary proceedings 
should not be overly adversarial). In Massachusetts, this approach would create little added 
cost for school districts because the Massachusetts anti-bullying law already requires 
schools to have a strategy to provide counseling to victims of bullying. See Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 71, § 37O(d)(x) (2010). 
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allegation.271 Therefore, this proposal would both protect a bully’s op-
portunity to a fair hearing and prevent further harm to the victim.272 
Conclusion 
 The Massachusetts legislature has recently entitled students to the 
right to counsel and cross-examination in most long-term suspension 
and expulsion hearings. Unfortunately, these additional rights under-
mine the extensive and necessary efforts that the state legislature has 
taken to address school bullying. Furthermore, victims of bullying, who 
are entitled to a safe and secure environment at school, will likely have 
little judicial recourse to address the harms of cross-examination. As a 
result, the Massachusetts legislature may have made the school bullying 
climate even more dangerous. 
 At the same time, accused bullies have little judicial recourse to 
address the unfairness or inaccuracies of the allegations at their disci-
plinary hearing. Given that students who are suspended for long peri-
ods of time are more likely to drop out of school and wind up in jail, it 
is unwise to repeal the recent measures enacted by the Massachusetts 
legislature. Instead, to ensure that alleged bullies are given a fair op-
portunity to defend allegations at their disciplinary hearing without 
undermining the necessary efforts to protect victims from bullying, the 
law should be amended to allow victims to be cross-examined by a neu-
tral third-party away from the bully’s counsel. 
                                                                                                                      
271 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; Lyon, supra note 218, at 113–14 (noting that when chil-
dren are questioned in a non-leading or non-accusatorial manner, the questions repetition 
has a lesser effect on the child’s consistency). 
272 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846; Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12; Cunningham & Hurley, supra 
note 205, at 12; Epstein et al., supra note 34, at 475; Weddle, supra note 8, at 651. 
  
INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
